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to heterosexuality, while 38-45% demonstrated positive 
change away from homosexuality on a scale from exclusive 
homosexuality to bisexuality to exclusive heterosexuality. 
Change in sexual orientation did occur for some, and the 
process showed no deleterious psychological consequences, 
either for those experiencing change or not.
The final two chapters discuss the implications of 
the findings.  The fact that one-third actually “failed” 
at the attempt implies that Christian therapy is not a 
magic potion instantly curing all who seek reorientation. 
On the other hand, the overall results demonstrate very 
convincingly that for some, change is possible, especially 
for those highly motivated and supported to do so.  Jones 
and Yarhouse conclude, “We found empirical evidence that 
change of homosexual orientation may be possible through 
involvement in Exodus ministries, either (1) in the form 
of an embrace of chastity with a reduction in prominence 
of homosexual desire, or (2) in the form of a diminishing 
of homosexual attraction and an increase in heterosexual 
attraction with resulting satisfactory heterosexual 
adjustment” (364).
There are several limitations to the study, many of which 
are honestly highlighted by Jones and Yarhouse.  The final 
sample of 73 was significantly fewer than the 300 for which 
they were hoping, and the loss of one-third of the original 
98 at the three-year mark is disappointing.  However, this 
is not atypical for longitudinal research.  Another issue for 
which many will cry “foul” is that the funding for the study 
was provided by Exodus International—the umbrella 
organization of the very ministries that were providing the 
therapy under investigation.  In order to dispel accusations 
of conflict of interest, Jones and Yarhouse transparently go 
into painstaking detail—almost too much—throughout 
the 414 pages of the book.  The reason the results are tough 
to wade through is that raw counts rather than percentages 
are displayed in many of the tables.  Although a long read 
for a research study, it is the first of its kind and will no 
doubt prove itself to be an influential work in the field. 
How has the professional community responded to 
the Jones and Yarhouse study?  One positive indication is 
that they were selected to present the results of a three-
year follow-up (indicating continued change for those 
in the original study) at the August 2009 meeting of the 
American Psychological Association (APA) in Toronto, 
Canada.  Ironically, however, at the same conference just 
three days before their presentation (which was scheduled 
on the final conference day—Sunday—at 8 a.m.), the 
APA governing council adopted a resolution reaffirming 
the position that therapeutic efforts to help homosexuals 
desiring to change are not effective and that such therapy 
should be avoided because it may be harmful.  This mixed 
reception for Jones and Yarhouse’s work indicates a long 
road ahead.  I am reminded that physicist Max Planck 
once said, “A new scientific truth does not triumph by 
convincing its opponents and making them see the light, 
but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new 
generation grows up that is familiar with it.”4  Although 
many in the professional establishment are ignoring 
contrary findings, there is hope for paradigm change ahead 
if this type of careful inquiry continues to be carried out.
Endnotes
1. American Psychiatric Association (2008).  Therapies Focused 
on Attempts to Change Sexual Orientation (Reparative 
or Conversion Therapies). Arlington, VA: Author. 
[Retrieved from www.psych.org/Departments/
EDU/Library/APAOfficialDocumentsandRelated/
PositionStatements/200001a.aspx.]
2  American Psychological Association. (2008). Answers to your 
questions: For a better understanding of sexual orientation and 
homosexuality. Washington, DC: Author. [Retrieved from 
www.apa.org/topics/sorientation.pdf.]
3. In order to allow for comparison with a national 
sample, Jones and Yarhouse used the same questions 
used in the National Health and Social Life Survey 
(NHSLS), which is a well-regarded national survey of 
adult sexual history and behavior.
4. Jones and Yarhouse, 364.
5. See Max Planck, Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers, 
trans. F. Gaynor (New York, 1949), 33-34.
In the seemingly endless stream of books that deal with 
the so-called creation-evolution debate, one might question 
the value of reading about yet two more in this area. 
However, by comparing and contrasting these two books, I 
hope to show that they both address a fundamental concept 
that is often overlooked in this debate, namely that living 
things have properties which cannot be reduced to physical 
laws.  While both authors argue for this irreducibility in 
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living things, Jacob Klapwijk includes it in his acceptance of 
evolution, arguing that the special properties of living things 
arise by emergence. Although Klapwijk makes many helpful 
points in his book, I am not convinced by his argument. 
It is Meyer who shows that evolutionary emergence cannot 
happen spontaneously because living things contain 
biological information that is evidence of Intelligent Design 
(ID). I find this argument to be persuasive.
Jacob Klapwijk is a Dutch philosopher in the 
Reformational tradition of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven and 
an emeritus professor of the Free University in Amsterdam. 
He writes this book to offer a broader philosophical 
reflection on evolution, from the Reformational perspective. 
Stephen Meyer is an American philosopher of science with a 
background in geophysics. His book is an autobiographical 
account of his journey to understand more about the 
mechanism of the origin of life from non-life.  While both 
authors are Christians, the nature of each of their books 
is different. Klapwijk argues explicitly from a Christian 
perspective, but Meyer wants his arguments for ID to be 
seen as scientific instead of religious, so he intentionally 
avoids religious arguments.  
Purpose in the Living World?
Creation and Emergent Evolution
Klapwijk’s argument is the following three points, which 
I will address in turn:
(1)	 Evolution is based on facts, “facts as hard as nails” 
(2).
(2)	 The world, particularly the living world, func-
tions at multiple levels, each with its own set of 
laws or principles that cannot be reduced to lower 
levels.
(3)	 Therefore, these levels must have emerged as or-
ganisms evolved.
Though Klapwijk accepts evolution, he does not 
present detailed arguments but accepts the conclusions of 
the mainstream scientific community.  To a certain extent 
this acceptance is understandable, given that Klapwijk 
writes from a philosophical position and not a scientific 
one. However, he does acknowledge difficulties in the 
evolutionary scenario, particularly in the origin of life,1 
only to ignore those difficulties by stating that evolution 
happened anyway (225 and elsewhere).  Further, his use 
of the word facts in his discussion of evolution shuts down 
debate even though he is aware of the challenges that 
exist.  It is surprising that Klapwijk uses the term facts since 
philosophers do not speak of facts in science but of data and 
interpretations of those data.2 
Although Klapwijk accepts that evolution occurred, 
he does reject Darwinian evolution, which is an “aimless 
process of development” (6), driven purely by chance. On 
the contrary, Klapwijk affirms God’s sovereignty over the 
creative process, including evolution.  It is in this sense that 
the word purpose in the book’s title is meant.
The second part of Klapwijk’s argument concerns the 
stratification that exists in creation.   Living things conform 
to biotic laws, such as reproduction and homeostasis, which 
cannot be reduced to physical laws.  While the biotic domain 
is found in all living things, Klapwijk argues that plants have 
yet another level, namely a vegetative domain, associated with 
growth and development.  Animals have yet another level, 
the sensitive domain, while humans have a mental domain 
(117), which can be further subdivided.3  Klapwijk makes 
several points about these different levels. First, he points 
out that each level is dependent on lower level functions but 
cannot be reduced to them.  That is why one cannot describe 
life or its origin using merely physical descriptions.  Living 
things have separate sets of laws or principles. Klapwijk also 
shows how lower levels are subservient to higher levels; e.g., 
physical processes are controlled by biotic functions in living 
organisms, and the biotic laws in turn are subservient to 
sensitive functions in animals.  I agree with these points and 
find them helpful in understanding the relationships among 
the different levels. 
As an aside, while Klapwijk does not list the carrying 
and transmission of information as one of the biotic 
functions, I see them as a vital aspect of biotic function.  The 
cell’s information is the cell’s identity.  It’s not the physical 
components of the cell that are important to reproduce; these 
are continually recycled anyway.  It’s the cell’s information 
that is maintained and reproduced through the information 
stored in its DNA sequence and many other factors that 
regulate how the information on the DNA is expressed.4
While I find Klapwijk’s argument for stratification 
helpful, I also have some points of disagreement.  Klapwijk 
argues that the biotic domain is characterized by self-
organization and spontaneous self-regulation (107).  While 
there is self-organization and self-regulation in cells, I’m 
not sure I would call them spontaneous, which to me is a 
property of a physical and not a biotic domain. The scientist 
in me sees spontaneous as involving a change from a high 
energy state to a low energy state, which living things do 
only when they die. Living things remain in a higher energy 
state, interacting with their environment to do so. As I will 
describe later in the context of Meyer’s book, these properties 
of self-organization and self-regulation are regulated by the 
information contained in the cell.
Klapwijk’s categorization of single-celled organisms 
as being merely biotic and not vegetative also does not fit 
with what we find in creation.  Bacteria do not exist as single 
cells but in populations, often forming biofilms, generally 
with other species of bacteria and microorganisms.5  These 
biofilms have much different properties from individual cells, 
including growth and differentiation, so I would argue that 
bacteria collectively have a vegetative function as well.  There 
are many examples of endosymbiosis between single-celled 
organisms and animals (think of our own digestive systems 
and those of cows) that also undermine this distinction 
between levels and functional domains in the living world.
I would argue further that all mature6 living organisms 
have a sensitive domain. Bacteria are certainly sensitive to 
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their environment—indeed, Jacob and Monod (mentioned 
several times in the book) received their Nobel prize for 
elucidating the mechanism by which bacteria respond to a 
change in their nutritive environment.   The phenomenon 
of quorum-sensing allows bacteria to communicate with 
each other to ensure coordinated responses in a culture.  The 
single-celled alga Euglena has a light-sensitive spot, which 
allows it (with its flagellum) to respond appropriately to light. 
Plants are likewise sensitive to their environment, including 
systemic responses to infection and changes in photoperiod. 
Klapwijk acknowledges these types of responses but claims 
(216, 217) that only animals have a sensitive function 
because only they have nervous and endocrine systems. It 
is true that the cognitive abilities which higher animals have 
is not found in plants or single-celled animals, but such 
cognition is not likely to exist in insects or most invertebrates 
either.7  Even though insects and worms have nervous and 
endocrine systems, they don’t really have a brain, having a 
loose cluster of neuron cell bodies instead.    
The third point of Klapwijk’s argument deals with the 
emergence that he claims occurs in evolution.  Klapwijk 
claims that emergence is not an explanatory theory but a 
theoretical framework (118).  Perhaps, but that doesn’t 
help us understand the concept any better, nor does it 
convince the skeptical reader of its occurrence.  If one 
cannot demonstrate how it works, how can one deduce 
that it occurred without begging the question?  Klapwijk’s 
arguments seem to be derived merely because he accepts the 
“facts” of evolution. In contrast, I would argue that no origin 
of life research has clearly demonstrated that life has emerged 
from non-life. The existence of emergence becomes even less 
likely the more scientists study the “lower” forms of life and 
realize that they too have higher-level functions.
Before moving on to Meyer’s book, I want to make 
two additional comments.  In his discussion of emergence, 
Klapwijk (225ff) describes the sequence of the emergence of 
the higher domains over evolutionary time.  He expresses 
appropriate caution about whether each step of emergence 
happened relatively quickly or gradually (but favors the 
former).  He describes first the emergence of the biotic 
domain (bacteria), then the vegetative (plants), then the 
sensitive (animals).  However, this sequence is inconsistent 
with what we see in the fossil record, where animals appear 
long before plants.8  To be sure, photosynthetic bacteria 
and algae do appear before animals, but Klapwijk does not 
include them as having vegetative functions.  Thus Klapwijk’s 
sequence of emergence is inconsistent with the timing of the 
evolutionary sequence that he espouses.
Finally, I want to comment on Klapwijk’s characterization 
and criticism of the theory of ID. It can be difficult to 
characterize a particular position when its various proponents 
make different and potentially conflicting arguments. 
Klapwijk is right to criticize reductionistic arguments made 
by ID proponents. However, the reductionism of many 
in the ID community shouldn’t be surprising, given that 
the rest of the scientific community is also by and large 
reductionistic.  Similarly, Klapwijk is correct in opposing 
any attempts to use ID to support natural theology, the 
view that the findings of science present evidence for God.9 
However, Klapwijk characterizes ID as a God-of-the-gaps 
argument (25), which points to God’s action only where 
scientific explanations are lacking. By doing so, Klapwijk is 
turning ID into a religious argument, which is not the claim 
made by most ID proponents.  Thus calling ID a God-of-
the-gaps argument is a straw man because ID proper deals 
with the scientific evidence for design in the universe.
Signature in the Cell: DNA and
the Evidence for Intelligent Design
As its subtitle implies, Meyer’s book argues in favor of 
ID, which pits him against Klapwijk, although the two do 
not address each other’s work.  This book is somewhat longer 
than Klapwijk’s, but its focus is narrower, concentrating 
primarily on the cell and the transition from non-life to 
life.  The book is an autobiographical account (longer than 
it needed to be, but still an easier read than Klapwijk’s), in 
which Meyer concludes that living things contain complex 
specified information and that there is no natural means 
of acquiring this information, hence his argument for 
intelligent design.  In chapter 4, Meyer elaborates on what he 
means by complex specified information.  He explains that 
in information theory, Shannon information (named after 
the information theorist Claude Shannon) is directly related 
to complexity.  The more complex an arrangement is, the 
more Shannon information it contains.  On the other hand, 
specified information is more than Shannon information 
because it prescribes a function.  For example, the letters 
and spaces in the sentence you are presently reading contain 
the same amount of Shannon information that they would 
have if they were arranged randomly.  However, the specified 
information in the two sets of letters and spaces (hopefully!) 
is quite different because one conveys information and 
the other doesn’t.  Meyer goes on to explain that a cell’s 
complexity involves not only specified information encoded 
in the DNA but also a processing system to interpret that 
information in order for that cell to survive and reproduce. 
Meyer examines and eliminates several possibilities 
that have been proposed for the source of this specified 
information.  In chapter 10 he explains that the minimum 
amount of information needed for a living cell is far too 
much for it to have arisen by chance.  Another possibility 
is that chemical or physical laws may exist to produce the 
necessary information, but he shows this to be impossible in 
chapters 11-13.  Computer programs have been designed to 
simulate the emergence of specified complexity, but Meyer 
shows how they too require input of information (besides 
the obvious fact that information is needed to design the 
computer programs in the first place). 
Having eliminated natural sources of specified 
information, Meyer, in chapter 15, argues that the best 
explanation for its source is intelligent design.  The next 
question to address is the adequacy of ID to produce 
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specified information.  To do this, Meyer makes an 
analogy with humans, whose intelligence permits them 
to generate specified information (329). Thus for Meyer, 
intelligent design is the best explanation for the source of the 
information found in the cell.
I must admit that it is at this point that I become less 
comfortable with Meyer’s argument. I agree that chance 
and physical or chemical laws cannot produce specified 
complexity.  I also agree that humans can produce such 
complexity.  It’s pulling these two statements together to 
say that living things show evidence of intelligent design 
analogous to what humans do that makes me somewhat wary. 
The obvious question that an ID critic would ask is, “But 
how did such a designing intelligence introduce specified 
information in the formation of life?”  I have not seen a 
satisfactory answer from the ID camp at this point, but the 
response would be that ID is merely establishing that there is 
evidence for ID; the mechanism is a separate question. One 
could propose many possible mechanisms. Did God at some 
point suspend his usual “laws of nature” in the evolution of 
the first living cell to bring in specified information?  Or did 
God instantly create living things out of nothing, complete 
with specified information? These are unsatisfactory 
questions for many theistic ID opponents (including 
Klapwijk), who hold to the concept of methodological 
naturalism, the idea that God used only natural processes 
in creation.
I have two comments in response to these concerns. 
First, note that the argument has now become a religious 
argument, but ID claims to be a scientific argument.  To 
be sure, there are religious implications of ID, but they 
are separate from the question of the scientific evidence 
for design.  Indeed, Meyer’s chapter 18 is devoted to the 
argument that ID is scientific, not religious. Second, I agree 
that methodological naturalism is a useful working model, 
necessary in experimental science (my students may not 
invoke miracles for the results of their experiments) but 
also useful in historical science, the study of past processes 
including evolution.  However, to say that methodological 
naturalism must be true seems to be telling God how he 
must have created.  I’m not prepared to take that step. Yet 
after all this, there remains the unanswered question of how 
the specified information in living things came to be.  Just 
as Klapwijk’s assertion of emergence is unsatisfying without 
a mechanism, so too is the claim for specified complexity 
without a mechanism.
Before I conclude this review, I would like to try to 
tie together Meyer’s concept of specified information with 
Klapwijk’s concept of emergence.  Although Meyer does not 
address the higher levels that Klapwijk describes, I believe 
that specified information also applies to these higher levels. 
This can be illustrated in embryonic development, where 
we do find emergence.  A single-celled human zygote has 
merely a biotic function (although it does interact with its 
surroundings), but as it divides and forms an embryo, we 
see the emergence of different tissues (vegetative), a nervous 
system (sensitive), and consciousness (mental). But this is not 
the emergence that Klapwijk describes in the evolutionary 
scenario.  Here we have the information already expressed 
in the zygote, which is used for the development of the 
mature individual.  Unlike the evolutionary sequence, the 
developmental emergence sequence is highly prescribed and 
tightly regulated.
In summary, Klapwijk accepts evolution but also argues 
for the stratification of living things, which lead to his 
argument for emergence in evolution.  By contrast, Meyer 
argues that the emergence of specific information found in 
the cell could not have happened by evolution but is evidence 
for intelligent design.  I agree that there are irreducibility and 
stratification in creation, particularly between life and non-
life.  But the emergence of new levels does not just happen; 
it requires information.  Without this information, Emperor 
Emergence still has no clothes.
Endnotes
1. Theistic evolutionists like Francis Collins and Simon 
Conway Morris do, as well.  Klapwijk explicitly rejects 
the label of “theistic evolutionist” (36), but it is not 
clear to me what his exact position is, since he accepts 
evolution and is obviously a theist.  It may be the 
reductionistic perspective of theistic evolutionists that 
Klapwijk rejects.
2. Even scientific data are collected in a context of 
worldviews and presuppositions.
3. In this stratification Klapwijk follows in the tradition 
of Dooyeweerd, although to my knowledge the latter 
did not describe a vegetative domain. See: http://www.
dooy.salford.ac.uk/aspects.html for more details.
4. The burgeoning field of epigenetics studies how 
the environment affects our biology, i.e. how gene 
expression is affected by experiences.
5. This is why the standard method of culturing pure 
strains of bacteria to study them tells us little about 
how they normally function.
6. I will point out later how different levels may emerge 
in embryonic development.
7 Cephalopods like the octopus and squid are notable 
exceptions to this generalization.
8 Genesis 1 does describe the creation of plants before 
animals, but Klapwijk does not hold that this chapter 
is an historical record of creation in the modern 
scientific sense (30).
9. Incidentally, Klapwijk cites the J.M. Templeton 
book on page 26, but this book and the Templeton 
Foundation do not support the concept of ID.
